What it takes to save Bosnia: 'Independent' readers want firmer action against the Serbs. Edward Cowan outlines a strategy for peace through intervention

THE UNITED Nations' mandated tasks in Bosnia up to now have been to protect humanitarian aid, impose an air exclusion zone, and create safe areas. The aim has been to save life and provide time for a political settlement to be achieved - except that so far no political settlement has proved possible.

The arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims has given the Bosnian Serb forces huge superiority in armaments. They have now renewed offensive operations in order to finish the war on their terms. Their strategic objectives are to clear the north and east of Muslim enclaves and people, secure road and rail routes around Bihac to Knin in the Krajina region, enlarge the Brcko corridor, eliminate the Maglaj pocket, cut off the Tuzla salient, aim for a share of the capital, Sarajevo, and seek an outlet to the Adriatic skirting Montenegro via Gorazde.

Despite the limited armaments at its disposal, the Bosnian government has fought to consolidate its hold on central Bosnia, to retain East Mostar and defeat Croatian forces in the Lasva and Vrbas valleys where the British UN contingent has been based. Now, with a Croat-Muslim peace accord in place, Bosnian government forces have turned their attention to Serb areas. The war therefore continues unabated.

In these circumstances it is right to ask why the UN should remain involved; and if it does, what its political and military aims should be. Western governments - ever mindful of Russia, the lives of soldiers and the public purse - wish to avoid a ground war and, by the use of air power, frighten off the Bosnian Serbs from their murderous assault on Gorazde, avoiding repetition elsewhere. Unfortunately, air power does not have a good history as a war stopper. The German defence of Cassino in Italy and Normandy in 1944 are two examples from British military experience which show that it is armies, not air forces, that secure ground and defeat an enemy. Offensive air power prepares the way, as in the Gulf - and, when effective, saves the lives of soldiers in the subsequent ground assault force.

Nato's ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs on 22 April has achieved a ceasefire around Gorazde and other safe areas, inducing an uneasy stalemate. Shortly, however, the fighting will shift elsewhere. More radical action is therefore required if the UN is not be to be immersed in Bosnia for half a century, defending numerous safe areas and ceasefire lines.

It is the toys of war that need to be removed from the field of play throughout Bosnia, and the men who use them must be demobilised back to the urban and simple rural backgrounds from which they came. Total demilitarisation should be the primary military aim, held in place by an international force of reducing numbers thereafter until a full and just peace is achieved for Bosnia and the threat of war is lifted from elsewhere in the Balkans. All territory taken by force should be returned to its rightful owners and the principle of a multi-ethnic society reinstated.

Demilitarisation can only be achieved in stages. First, after the necessary international resources have been committed and assembled, there needs to be a complete ceasefire which, if broken, will lead to immediate retribution from land or air.

Second, all heavy weapons should be concentrated under strong international protection and destroyed, together with armament factories and munitions dumps.

Third, all regular and irregular forces should be disarmed, brought to demobilisation camps and returned to their families and homes.

Fourth, in parallel with these actions, roads and railways should be secured, repaired and reopened. Mines and other obstacles should be cleared using local military labour under close international supervision.

Fifth, public services covering transport, water, sewerage and power should be restored and a massive 'shelter' programme embarked upon - with responsibility being returned on a gradual basis to local authorities.

Preparation and execution of the first phase would be a complex and difficult operation involving the transportation and assembly of a sizeable international force. This could only be done through Croatia, for example the port of Split, and into Bosnian government territory, acting as a springboard before entry into Serb-held areas. It would take at least three months of preparation, leaving current UN forces backed by air power to thwart a pre- emptive Bosnian Serb offensive. It might be wiser to place the operation under Nato command to draw a distinction between the war role of the latter and the peace-keeping image of the UN. It would also reduce political interference in tactical matters.

The threat of air power would be a key component in a sequence of negotiation for the peaceful entry of Nato troops to all parts of Bosnia, followed by ultimatums where required and, in the event of their non-compliance, air strikes within Bosnian Serb-held areas against military and military-industrial targets and, if necessary, against similar targets in Serbia. The Serbian reaction to date suggests that they would not fight thereafter except for minor infringements, but Nato ground forces should be fully prepared to attack military targets with close air support to establish total occupation and compliance.

The international ground force 'mix' will require some highly mobile, lightly equipped troops such as parachutists, marines and other special forces together with forward air controllers and artillery observation officers able to infiltrate to gun sites, communication centres, command posts, troop concentrations and munitions dumps in remote and difficult country. A helicopter troop-lift force would therefore be required. The majority of a heavier infantry-based force would need vehicles with good protection and firepower such as the British Warrior, which has proved so successful in Bosnia, armoured reconnaissance vehicles, a limited number of tanks, short- and medium-range anti-tank weapons, and some helicopter portable artillery for use when the weather or other factors preclude the use of air power.

The key must be to have a 'balanced' force available for a number of eventualities which is superior in fighting ability to the other combatants, particularly the Serbs, and is sufficient in numbers. The troop numbers required would exceed 60,000, or roughly two divisions. Bearing in mind the difficulties the UN has encountered in assembling its present force of 15,000 in Bosnia, some may consider this to be unattainable, but it is a matter of political priorities.

An operation of this nature will be complex, requiring all the skill, technical advantage and ingenuity of 'first eleven' armies. The field of choice is therefore restricted to Nato nations, at least in the initial and hardest phase. With American reluctance to commit ground troops to Bosnia except when peace is assured, this commitment would fall upon the British and French armies, with some assistance from other European nations. The British Army, which is reducing to 40 infantry battalions under Options for Change, could not sustain a divisional-sized contribution for more than one year. The same applies to the French. However, with a successful ceasefire in place and demilitarisation under way, would it be too much to ask the Americans to take part thereafter and to perform with competence?

Those who have supported intervention have seen the bill but not the surcharge - the deaths of our soldiers and airmen. This year we will remember the sacrifices of another generation on D-Day in 1944, when 37,000 servicemen gave their lives for the defeat of fascism. In the years that follow the present debacle in Bosnia, will we reflect how wise our government was to avoid further commitment beyond a peace-keeping role, or will we curse its expediency, which allowed this war to spread until half Europe was alight with the fires of conflict? Beware of easy options - there are none.

The author is former British defence attache to Belgrade (1987-90), and a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

(Photograph omitted)