Boeing 737 Max project flawed because of ‘incredibly pressurised’ design process

Former engineer who worked on project tells BBC ‘Panorama’: ‘My family won’t fly on a 737 Max’

One of the engineers who helped design the aircraft involved in two fatal crashes has told the BBC: “My family won’t fly on a 737 Max.”

Adam Dickson worked at Boeing for more than 30 years and led a team of engineers working on the 737 Max. He told the Panorama programme that production of the aircraft was not adequately funded.

The latest variant of the highly successful Boeing twin-jet is currently grounded worldwide after two fatal crashes killed a total of 346 people.

Mr Dickson told Panorama: “Certainly what I saw was a lack of sufficient resources to do the job in its entirety.

“The culture was very cost centred, incredibly pressurised. Engineers were given targets to get certain amount of cost out of the aeroplane.”

He also said engineers were under pressure to downplay new features on the 737 Max.

“The goal was to show that those differences were so similar to the previous design that it would not require a major design classification in the certification process.

“There was a lot of interest and pressure on the certification and analysis engineers in particular, to look at any changes to the Max as minor changes.”

One fundamental change was the introduction of an anti-stall system known as MCAS. It is software designed to intervene when a potentially dangerous “angle of attack” between the airflow and the wing is detected.

But in both Boeing 737 Max tragedies – the Lion Air accident in October 2018 and the Ethiopian Airlines crash in March 2019 – pilots struggled vainly to save the plane as MCAS tilted the aircraft nose down in response to a faulty sensor.

“It’s frightening to see such a major incident because of a system that didn’t function properly or accurately,” said Mr Dickson.

A Boeing 737 pilot, Chris Brady, told Panorama: “If you’re going to design and certify an airliner with such a complicated obscure failure mode as happened to that crew, it’s no wonder that your average crew aren’t able to deal with it.”

Boeing insists the 737 Max programme involved “the same level of scrutiny and engineering assessment” as an all-new aircraft.

“Sometimes, changes in airline or passenger requirements, aviation and environmental regulations, and advances in technology warrant the creation of an all-new airplane.

”But frequently, the best course of action is to update an existing airplane model. This allows for technological advances and innovation to be utilised earlier.

“Airplane derivatives undergo the same rigorous, gated development process ... as ‘all-new’ programmes.

“Each change is subject to robust discussion, analysis and testing. In the case of the 737 Max, years of work and testing went into the changes that were made on the aircraft.”

Last week Boeing announced a $3.4bn (£2.7bn) second-quarter loss as a result of the 737 Max grounding.

Between April and June 2019 commercial plane deliveries fell by more than half to 90.

Payouts to airlines whose planes are standing idle or which are expecting deliveries of the aircraft have cost the planemaker $4.9bn.

On the same day as the Panorama programme, Ryanair said it did not expect to start flying the plane until January 2020. It has ordered 210 Boeing 737 Max aircraft in a unique, high-density configuration.

British Airways’ parent company, IAG, has signed a Letter of Intent – a non-binding order – for 200 of the Max aircraft.

‘Panorama: Boeing’s Killer Planes’ is broadcast on Monday 29 July at 8.30pm on BBC1